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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

INTEGRATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD INTO THE TOTAL FORCE

BY

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ABSTRACT

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This project addressed the evolution of the Total Force and compared the United States Air Force's and the United States Army's approach to the integration of the Air and Army National Guard. Defense strategy, budget and force structure were reviewed in consonance of cultural and structural barriers to integration. Research concluded that the cultural barriers that have emerged over time between the Army and the Army National Guard still hamper effective integration. Although similar barriers originally retarded the Air Force and Air National Guard integration, major barriers were mitigated by a combination of urgency, strong AF leadership, and political acumen. Structural barriers are a result of the cultural schism that permeated the Army and Army Guard's history. The dual status of the National Guard based on the Air Guard and Air Force experience is dismissed as a structural fatal flaw. Failure to assuage cultural and structural barriers could leave the nation with a military force that cannot execute a national defense strategy, and a military isolated from the people it serves.

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INTEGRATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD INTO THE TOTAL FORCE

I ask each of you to create an environment that eliminates all residual barriers - structural and cultural - for effective integration within our Total Force.

- William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense Memorandum, September 4, 1997

Secretary of Defense Cohen's memorandum sounded a wake up call for active and reserve component leaders. Secretary Cohen pointedly named two types of residual barriers of Total Force integration: cultural and structural. There exists a long-standing rivalry between active and reserve resulting in contention among and between components. It has psychological and sociological origins and is reinforced by everyday interaction. The division between active and guard is troubling because an essential component of national defense planning is how well America's armed forces integrate the active, guard and reserve in the Total Force of the 21st Century.

Integration of the active and reserve components has been an elusive goal. There has been no lack of criticism of the militia, volunteers, and the National Guard throughout history. Criticism has traditionally been on lack of readiness, poor officer leadership, and most

recently a lack of availability on short notice. The criticism has been offset by complaints from the reserve forces that they have been under-funded, and not allowed to train in first line equipment. Much of both the criticism and the responses have been valid, except the short notice availability, leaving controversy wide open to biased interpretation.

The Army and the National Guard relationship reached a new level of distrust during 1997. The <u>Congressional</u>

Quarterly wrote that:

Even in the best of times, the Army and the Army National Guard don't get along, the centuries old rivalry of professional and part time soldiers. However, these are lean times at the Pentagon and in the scramble for scarce resources in new weapons and manpower, the hard feelings between the Army and the Guard has erupted into public animosity.²

The National Defense Panel's report stated: " . . . the Army has suffered from a destructive disunity among its components, specifically between the active Army and the National Guard."

Cohen's call for effective integration of the reserve and active components is a familiar refrain." Dr. Mars, a former DOD official responsible in part for the Total Force Policy was more direct when he stated that a traditional obstacle to developing a credible reserve has been

ingrained attitudes - we versus they approach - the declination of responsibility for Guard/Reserve problems - the view that any move to upgrade the reserves would downgrade active forces."

This paper addresses the evolution of the Total Force and compares the United States Air Force and the United States Army's approach to the integration of the Air and Army National Guard. It includes consideration of strategy, budget, and force structure. This paper provides an objective appraisal of the facts regarding integration of the Air and Army National Guard into a seamless 21st Century Total Force. Carefully considered opinions for the future are provided for consideration. A specified force neither structure, nor an active - National Guard force mix is recommended. Conclusions drawn concerning the Air and Army National Guard's experience or integration with their active components may not necessarily apply to the Army or Air Force reserve but they should not be ignored solely because they are a part of another components experience. To better understand the issues relating to the Guard, a brief review of the militia and its traditions is provided.

THE LEGACY OF THE MILITIA TRADITION

THE MILITIA PERIOD

The perdurability of the National Guard is based not only in law, but on the Constitution as well. Professor Newland, a U.S. Army War College historian, wrote that understanding the Guards history is essential to understanding the contemporary debate over the roles of the National Guard. Many others have examined the history of the Guard and roles played in providing for the common defense. The National Guard is the modern descendant of the militia, whose existence and roles are enumerated in the Constitution. Militia clauses are found in article I, section eight, paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Constitution.

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority for training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.⁸

Few U.S. public agencies have their existence assured by both law and the Constitution; no other governmental entity has a dual federal and state mission so specified.

The National Guard is an entity located in the states but with national defense responsibilities. This dual nature has been of great benefit to the nation; at the same time, it can be a source of problems, frustrations, and tension between the Guard, the regulars, and the reserves. duality of the National Guard has been a contentious issue since colonial times. The American attempt to define and implement a national defense policy began in the spring of 1783. General Washington's Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, provided a blueprint for an economically affordable system for defense, incorporating in its design a national militia using the militia tradition but avoiding a large standing army which would concern those that feared the national government. 9 Washington proposed minimum standing forces; primarily relying on a well organized militia trained to national standards but located in the states. This dual relationship is a source of cultural and structural tension.

The Militia Act of 1792 provided implementing legislation for these constitutional provisions although the national focus of this militia was largely ignored. 10 Even though the Nation fought the wars of the 19th Century with much of the original militia legislation, the War of 1812 in particular identified inadequacies of the militia

structure. It was not, however, until the Spanish American War of 1898 that sufficient impetus was provided for major reforms of the U.S. military organization and structure

THE REFORM ERA

In the first two decades of the twentieth century, there was a flurry of reform legislation. During this period the Army sought to eliminate the Guard in favor of a federal reserve. Congress, with which the state and local origins of the Guard have always resonated, consistently preserved the Guard as a major combat reserve. In the early years of the twentieth century, the Dick Act of 1903; the National Defense Act of 1916, and the National Defense Act of 1920 strengthened the militia, now known formally as the National Guard. Despite the excellent performance of Guard Divisions in World War I contention among the military components did not subside. 11 The National Guard Association of the United States engaged in a vocal and vitriolic battle with the Army over the role of the Guard in America. 12 Through these three laws, the Guard was established as the primary organized reserve force. These reform acts revolutionized Guard structure and formally named the militia the National Guard, defined presidential mobilization authority, and increased federal control of

the National Guard. By 1920, a tripartite military structure of regulars, the National Guard, and the Reserves was formalized by statute. The active forces would support and command the organized reserves, and would support the National Guard, but not command it unless mobilized into federal service. The reform era added to the legacy of antagonism and mistrust between the Guard and the regulars. During this era of reform, the National Guard aviation units began to evolve from the miniscule aviation units of the early 1900's. 13

EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN NATIONAL GUARD

NATIONAL GUARD AVIATION

In 1921, the federal government recognized the first National Guard air reconnaissance squadron, setting the stage for emergence of the Air National Guard. By 1940, there were twenty-nine National Guard observation squadrons. Ordered into federal service for World War II these squadrons served in every theater during the war. 14 Following WW II, as the Air National Guard was emerging as a separate air arm, the Army again attempted to mobilize support for eliminating the Guard's dual status and make it part of the national reserve. Congress quashed the whole effort. The National Guard entered the Cold War era with

many of the same cultural and structural barriers that had been in place since the Spanish American War. Some Army leaders failed to appreciate the powerful bond between the Guard, its communities, and its elected federal representatives. The active soldiers often saw the Guard as poorly led, political, and siphoning limited Army funds. Some Army leaders, notably George Marshall understood the powerful attraction of the American people to the citizensolider ethos. He also realized the political leverage the Guard's dual status provided. 15

The Air Force emerged as an independent service with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The Air National Guard's role as a reserve of the Air Force, and as a State entity was not fully accepted by Air Force hard line traditionalists. 16 Despite this prejudice, Air Force leadership was compelled by the immediacy of the Korean War to make integration work. 17 The Korean mobilization highlighted serious problems in Air Force mobilization planning, budgeting, and training strategies. Air Force senior leadership committed the organization to making integration a priority. Any hard feelings and parochialism that existed between the Air Force and the Air National Guard were put to rest during and after the Korean War.

The Air Guard was given new missions and increased responsibilities during the Cold War. Essential elements of the Air Force and Air National Guard integration programs were: the runway alert program of 1953; the gaining command concept where the AF accepted responsibility for inspecting, and supervising the training of all Air National Guard units. The runway alert program had two Air Guard squadron's augmenting the active Air Force maintaining two aircraft and five aircrews on alert status. They were to be scrambled within five minutes of notification. The experiment was an outstanding success. The USAF reported that Air Guard aircrew performance was close to that of their regular Air Force counterparts. Air Force leaders included citizen-airmen in all mission areas. By the close of the 1960's, Air Guardsmen had a seat at the table in development of policies, plans, and programs at air staff and major command levels. 18 The Air Force and the Air National Guard had forged a relationship that recognized cultural differences while retaining focus on readiness and relevance.

For the National Guard the nations primary combat reserve, the political decision not to mobilize the Guard for the Vietnam War was a cataclysmic event that would shape America's defense strategy, budget and force

structure. The impact of the Vietnam experience and the Total Force Policy are discussed next

THE GUARD AND THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

The Vietnam War had a negative impact on the degree of trust and confidence in the ability of the reserve forces to support the active duty military during crises. As Lewis Sorley explained:

Those dedicated career Reservists who for years had devoted much of their free time and effort maintaining individual and unit readiness were bitterly disappointed that here was the very kind of crisis they had been preparing for, but they were not permitted to take part in it. That disappointment turned to dismay when, in the wake of the Presidents (Johnson) refusal to mobilize the reserves, they became a refuge for the disaffected, the dissident and draft dodger. 19

Vietnam engendered the substantive change in reserve policy since the mobilization of World War II. Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams argued that the Army should never go to war without the National Guard and reserves. Failure to mobilize the Guard for Vietnam was a policy failure by the U.S. government because we failed to engage the American people. Certain that we could never again go to war without the Guard and Reserve, Abrams reduced the number of active combat support and combat service support

units and placed these units in the Guard and reserve. The Army could not go to war without them.

Also, the Guard's role as the primary combat reserve appeared to be re-enforced by the Army's Roundout brigade concept.²⁰ The Army policy called for Guard Roundout brigades to have a close, but informal association with the active divisions they would join in deployment.

Presumably, the fate of the Roundout brigades and the divisions they were to join would be locked together.²¹

Mobilization of the National Guard would force the president to explain his war aims and would link the local communities to the war effort.

Defense leaders built upon the early integration efforts with policies that attempted to link strategy, budget and force structure. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger on 23 August 1973, said: "Total Force is no longer a concept. It is now the Total Force policy which integrates the Active, National Guard and reserves into a homogeneous whole."²²

In 1982, Secretary of Defense Weinberger enunciated the first to fight policy. Weinberger stated:

Under the Total Force Policy, each service Secretary is responsible for providing the manning, equipment, training, construction and maintenance necessary to ensure that Selected reserve units meet the readiness standard and deployment schedules required by our national contingency plans . . Units that fight first shall be equipped first, regardless of component. 23

In November 1983, Secretary of Defense Weinberger proclaimed that the all-volunteer force was no longer experimental. He said: "We know now that an all volunteer force can succeed and we know what it takes to make it succeed. We need only the will, the perseverance and the commitment to quality."²⁴ The commitment was reflected in adoption of incentives to attract both the prior service person and the new recruit to the reserve component.

Reliance on the less expensive reserve component was a necessity.²⁵ Weinberger also outlined a six criteria test for the use of military forces abroad in an attempt to avoid the future pitfalls of a Vietnam type war.²⁶

In the early 1980's, defense and strategy for the reserve components had clarity. The Total Force Policy implementation during the Reagan administration matched strategy, budget, and force structure. Contention among military components subsided with increased spending. The Air Force managed its reserve programs with a functional approach based on an institutional culture that had been responsive to the needs of the Guard and Reserve. The Army and Army Guard's relationship improved as integration

efforts, equipment modernization, and the Reagan build-up dampened force structure flash points.

This general calm was occasionally disrupted by reservists complaints about the attitude of the active forces; for example, one charged that the actives still [cling] tenaciously to the shibboleth that Reserve units and personnel are totally incompetent. Thus, members of the military in lower or subordinate positions often ignored the well-intentioned policy changes by higher-level policy makers. Despite Abram's and Weinberger's approach to better integration the Air Force success was not replicated.

CONGRESS REMAINS SKEPTICAL OF TOTAL FORCE INTEGRATION

Despite massive resources provided to the Air and Army National Guard during the military buildup of the 1980s, Congress deservedly remained skeptical about the effectiveness of the Army's Total Force Policy. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) examined how the Defense Department assigned missions to the reserve components. The GAO: "... could not determine the relative influence of the various factors on force mix decisions or the thoroughness of the decision process ... There is little documentation of decision making regarding reserve

components within those processes." Overall, the GAO concluded that the services employed largely informal criteria to make reserve force mix decisions. The federal budget deficit combined with the extra-ordinary events in Eastern Europe from 1979 - 1990 would reshape the national defense strategy. The Cold War victory required a new security strategy. Not surprisingly, the search for this emerging defense strategy and quest for the hyped peace dividend placed the Army National Guard even more at odds with the Army.

THE BASE FORCE TO THE GULF WAR

During the first two years of the Bush presidency, the Soviet block dissolved, and by the end of the third year, the Soviet Union had disintegrated. Concurrently, the economic and budget policy outlook for the United States rapidly deteriorated. The 1990 budget agreement had the unintended effect of making defense more vulnerable to future cuts. 30 On August 2, 1990, President Bush announced that the American military forces would be reduced by about twenty-five percent. The same day, Iraq invaded Kuwait. 31 The Total Force Policy would be tested in combat.

On August 22, 1990, President Bush authorized the first ever-involuntary call to active duty of the reserve under the Total Force Policy. By the end of the Gulf War

nearly 250,000 reservists and guardsmen were mobilized.

Because the President had logically and convincingly presented his case for mobilization to the American people's reaction to the first mobilization of the Total Force Guard was positive. With the Guard and the reserve, the country was also mobilized.

The Army's management of the Army National Guard's Roundout brigades during the Persian Gulf War, however, caused cultural and structural barriers to resurface. Particularly egregious has been the political and cultural damage to the Total Army based on the decision not to deploy the Army National Guard's Roundout brigades, an important part of the Total Force concept.

The post cold-war downsizing created chaos for the Department of Defense. The Base Force was nebulously defined as the force structure below which the nation could not go if we were to retain superpower status. Active duty personnel were to be cut by about 320,000 over the fiscal year 1992-1995 period and the proposed cut in reserves was 270,000 over the same period. As the forces were being cut, the operational tempo increased. The Army more so than the other services competes for resources with the politically astute and powerful National Guard. The Base Force plan, according to the Army National Guard was

unacceptable. The Guard lobbied heavily for an expanded role in national defense, often at the expense of the active force. The "we versus they" mindset often dominated the discussion about the Guard and active forces relationship.

The Bush defense team of Secretary of Defense Cheyney, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (JCS), General Powell lobbied hard for active and reserve force cuts in the Fiscal years 1992 and 1993 DOD budgets. Congress approved only about one-third of the Guard and Reserve reductions requested. General Powell argued: "What Congress has been doing for the last several years is denying us the opportunity to bring the reserve components down." Congress insisted that these issues be re-studied by an entity independent of the military departments. Congress was suspicious that the Department of Defense decisions to reduce the military reliance on the reserves was based more on parochialism than on rigorous analysis. 33

The resulting Rand report did little to address

Congresses concern and resulted in few if any changes in policy. 34 Despite the success of the Total Force in the Persian Gulf war, storm clouds rose, as the emerging defense strategy required a large active duty Army, and a reduction of Army Guard combat forces.

The Air Force's approach to the Air National Guard during this period was pragmatic and effective. Air Force Chief of Staff General McPeak, unlike his other JCS colleagues decided that base force structure cuts would come from the more expensive active duty forces, not the air reserve components. McPeak's decision reflected that the Air Force had removed the barriers that prevented full integration. In addition, it reinforced the political shrewdness of the Air Force leadership who worked to build a consensus for modernization by using the more costeffective air reserve components as a greater part of the Total Force. 35 The Bush-Cheyney-Powell's base force underlying strategy, force structure and budget projections were criticized by many in the Congress. The Army National Guard stung by the decision not to deploy the Roundout brigades during the Persian Gulf war opposed the base force cuts. Guard supporters argued that the proposed cuts did not factor in the cost advantages of the reserve component.

Clinton and the Bottom Up Review

In 1993, the Clinton administration conducted its own assessment, a Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of defense requirements. The goal was to maintain sufficient military power to simultaneously fight and win two major regional conflicts (MRCs). In military argot, a "Two MRC scenario".

The BUR fared poorly as either a strategy or a forcemodeling tool. 36 The BUR rekindled the angst between the Army and the Army National Guard. The Guard Roundout brigades were discarded in favor of preserving active duty force structure. Since fundamental questions about the BUR remained, the Army formed a task force consisting of the senior leadership of all three Army components. resulting off-site agreement confirmed Guard and Reserve strengths were to remain at 367,000 and 208,000 respectively. The Army Guard was to retain 15 enhanced brigades, and eight secondary reserve divisions. Secretary of Defense corroborated that the Guard's 15 enhanced brigades were the primary combat reserve forces. The results of the off site agreement made the Army Guard the de facto sole possessor of the reserve combat arms elements.

Air Force changes were less contentious. Air Guard end strength reductions of about 6000 (a five percent reduction) from the Fiscal Year 1993 level of 119,300, the highest end strength authorized in more than a decade, were accommodated by downsizing units and aircraft conversions. Critics argued that the BUR was a "train wreck". The critics charged that the BUR inadequately funded a force too large for the limited objectives that the

administration seeks to employ military forces. For the National Guard, the BUR reflected sharp differences between the Army's and Air Force approach.

Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces

The next defense review was the Committee on Roles and Missions. Again, the Guard would find the Congress as its strongest ally, as the citizen-soldiers roles and missions were reviewed. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 created the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) and authorized it to investigate ways to improve effectiveness of military operations. The CORM proposed the following:

"... DOD continues its efforts to ensure that the reserve components contribute as much as practical to executing national strategy. Significant savings and public good will can be generated by using reserve forces wherever they can provide a required military capability." 38

The CORM focused on making the BUR more affordable. The CORM determined that the Army's combat structure exceeded the two Major Regional Conflict requirements that had now become the primary post Cold War planning factor for conventional forces. The commission questioned whether the Guard's 15 enhanced brigades were needed, and concluded that the eight combat divisions (110,000 personnel) were not relevant. Guard supporters claimed that exclusion of

Guard combat divisions and brigades from war plans was an effort to retain more expensive active force structure.

The lack of a cogent Total Force strategy raised the cacophony among the Army, Guard, and Congress. The CORM failed to meet the congressional expectations for a greater role for the reserve components.

Almost six years after the "Cold War" victory, and four years since the striking victory in the Persian Gulf War, Congress remained dissatisfied with the results of the Base Force, BUR, and the CORM. In 1997, DOD carried out its regular Quadrennial Defense Review for periodic assessment of the correlation between military capability and security threats. Congress anticipating a rubber stamp ratification of the status quo created the National Defense Panel (NDP) to provide an independent assessment of military needs. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report was released in May 1997. The NDP report was released in December of 1997.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and National Defense Panel (NDP)

The QDR's strategic blue print for defense for the 2000 - 2008 time period left intact the central military force of 10 active Army divisions, a dozen aircraft carrier battle groups, and 20 AF fighter wings. Critical consensus

concluded that the QDR contributed little to post-Cold War military thinking, settling for maintenance of a Cold War military structure designed to allow. The QDR supported the CORM finding that the U.S. no longer needs as large a "strategic reserve" represented by the Guard's eight combat divisions.

The QDR's findings were unconvincing from several perspectives: the Army did not include the National Guard's 15 enhanced brigades in the two Major Theater War (MTW) scenarios, and did not mention the role of the Guard's eight divisions in the two MTW strategies. 40 Army Guard leadership were excluded from the QDR process. The state Governors appealed to the President outlining objections to the Army National Guard cuts. The Guard's lobbying force quickly mobilized congressional supporters. 41 As a result of the intense political pressure, the active, guard and reserves army leaders met at an "off-site" and agreed to apportion 17,000 cuts to the ARNG, and 3,000 to the Army Reserve by year 2000. The remaining 25,000 reductions would be determined later. At the off-site, the Army Guard outlined eleven principles that were part of the negotiated agreement on QDR troop cuts.42

But the Army staff, during sworn testimony before Congress, dismissed the principles as unaffordable goals.

A breakdown in trust resulted in a public feud between the Army and the Guard. The "we versus they" argument played out in the press as longstanding cultural and structural differences aired publicly. The Total Army was everything but seamless. Relationships between the Army components reached an all time low. A Washington Post defense writer dubbed the debate as the National Guard, Regular Army in a Tug of War.⁴³

The Congress rejected most of the proposed reserve personnel cuts. In essence, the DOD designed a smaller Cold War force. Congress continued to prod the services for better utilization of the National Guard. The NDP report concluded "the challenges of the twenty-first century will be quantitatively and qualitatively difference from those of the Cold War and require fundamental change to our national security institutions, military strategy, and defense posture by 2020."44

The NDP identified the two-theater war construct as an inhibitor to developing necessary capabilities; the two MTW was not a strategy, but a force sizing function. The report reaffirmed the Abram's Doctrine -- "citizen soldiers ensure the involvement of the American people in our nations security." Homeland defense was identified as a priority mission for the Army National Guard. As new

homeland defense missions develop "... the Guard should be used in lieu of active forces wherever possible." Left, as a basic issue is over which army component, the active, or guard is the most effective in the current strategic environment.

The NDP report was hailed by Guard supporters and criticized by DOD leadership. Continuing as an underlying determinant of the force mix issues were costs and readiness. Although beyond the scope of this project, strategy the third element of defense policy is viewed a root cause of the tension between the components of the Total Force.

The Clinton administrations defense strategy of shape, respond, and prepare was under-funded, at the same time, the administrations policy of engagement and enlargement had the Total Force deploying at unprecedented levels.

READINESS AND COST

Determining relevance or effectiveness in the active - guard force mix debate focuses on readiness and cost. The Gulf War debate over the Roundout Brigades from an Army view centered on readiness evaluations. Current Army readiness reporting credibility is in question. In contrast the Air National Guard units are combat ready and meet AF standards for readiness. Another critical

determinant in the active - reserve force mix is cost.

This is the most commonly cited reason for transferring assets and missions from the active to the reserve force.

The Guard does cost less, and given time, proper missions and active component support, can attain necessary readiness levels. The cusp of the readiness and cost argument is not the difference in capabilities between active and guard units, but the active components resourcing strategy. The mismatch between DOD budget and the programmed force structure makes tension inevitable.

Some suggest a less expensive and community based National Guard is part of the budget solution. Others contend that the Guard is the problem. Philip Gold, a defense analyst, addressed these issues in a Washington Times article with these points:

The political and cultural justifications for the Guard don't address one particular question: Can they be ready to do the job? Obviously, the answer depends on what the job is and what you mean by ready. Still 1 thing is clear. There is inherent reason the Guard cannot perform adequately across the range of its missions. High priority its can be filled with people willing to accept high levels of contractual obligation, including extended active duty and early call-up. In short, the Guard's proficiency is limited only by resource and creativity and by a standing army that, for reasons of its own, prefers not to acknowledge it ... that standing army isn't evil, its simply fighting for its institutional life and soul.48

DISCUSSION

This project examined the cultural and structural barriers to greater integration of the Army and Air National Guard into the active forces. The Army and the Air Force approach to integration were compared. The barriers that separate the active and National Guard were traced to the very beginnings of the Nation. During the twentieth - century the Army's prescription to resolve the cultural and structural barriers was elimination of the National Guard in favor of a federal reserve system.

It is too often forgotten is that neither the Army,
DOD, nor the JCS are mentioned in the Constitution as being
responsible for raising and supporting armies, or the
militia. This role is reserved for Congress. Congress,
protective of its role, generally has stopped any efforts
to eliminate or reduce the National Guard. The Guard by
design is the community based defense force; a force whose
mobilization is historically synonymous with the
mobilization of the American public. The National Guard
with over 475,000 members, organized into 3600 units, in
2700 different communities, serves as a point of reference
on defense. The activation of guard and reserve personnel
for World War I, World War II and Korea connected America

with the armed forces who otherwise were a small core of active professionals. Failure to mobilize the Guard and the Nation for the Vietnam War made this the first conflict that did not include large-scale participation by the Guard. Recognition of this error in the Vietnam War resulted in the Total Force Policy.

The Total Force policy offered three attractive benefits - economy, experience, and tradition. A modernized reserve force meant significant savings while adding to the overall readiness of the armed forces. The concept of the Total Force resurrected the Militia tradition. The Total Force policy sought closer integration between the reserve components and the active duty to force to deter war with the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War followed by the Total Force Persian Gulf victory was a starting point in revising defense strategy, budget, and force structure. The post Cold War era is almost a decade old, despite five major defense reviews uncertainty over force structure, budget shares, and relevance remains.

The Korean War would have a profound effect on the Air Force and the Air National Guard relationship. Air Guard aircrews and support personnel overcame the inadequacies of a bungled mobilization process, and along with the

leadership of the Air Force worked together in combat. success of this effort carried over to the structural development of the Air Force and the Air National Guard. In the post Korean era, the AF established formal relationships with the Air Guard. The duality issue prevalent in the Army/Army National Guard relationship was ignored at the unit level, and managed by Air Force and National Guard leaders at the federal and state levels. The adoption of the gaining command concept, commonality of training, active Air Force management and operational readiness inspections, served as the structural initiatives that promoted cultural cohesion and mutual understanding. The Air Force adopted the a total force funding and readiness strategies; war time tasking for the Air National Guard was based on mission and capabilities analysis. the citizen-airman this provided the raison d'être! The Army's attempt to integrate the Army National Guard appears to me to be episodic at best. The Army has been unwilling as an institution to accept the dual nature of the Guard. Dialogue between components has been absent at the senior levels -- vitriolic discussion was substituted instead.

The National Guard and the active services have a defined and identified culture. The differences in culture

that do not impede combat readiness can be embraced, or ignored. The current zero-sum game, and the pernicious rhetoric now being played between the Army and the Army National Guard only undermines public confidence.

The major defense reviews of the 1990's sought to adapt the United State's military forces to the post Cold War era. The Congress, the wild card in defense planning, rejected troop cuts planned for the Army National Guard in part due to the perceived disconnect between strategy, budget and force structure. The NDP recommended a transformation strategy and dropping the two major theater war force sizing strategy. It projected additional troop cuts, while arguing for an increased role for the Guard in homeland defense. The Air Force approach to integration, notwithstanding the mission vagaries, etc., provides some insight into the following recommendations for consideration.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following common sense recommendations are not new, but rather a compilation of research into a complex national defense issue. The extensive literature review reflected the biases engrained into the active - National Guard psyches. Particularly cogent and a basis for my recommendations are those of Stephen M. Duncan, former

Undersecretary for Reserve Affairs during the Reagan and Bush administrations. 49

- 1. Active and National Guard personnel must share operational and training experiences. Daily interaction must be a priority of leaders at all levels.
- 2. Professional military education is a dominant integration enabler. The current military education system requires additional contact hours on the reserve component issues and historical evolution.
- 3. The Army should adopt the AF/Air National Guard formalized gaining command arrangement. All Army National Guard units should be aligned with an active Army unit in peacetime and wartime.
- 4. The formalized Army-National Guard relationship requires the Army Guard to trade some of its autonomy for Army management and operational readiness inspections.
- 5. Full time manning for the Army National Guard must be increased if readiness and training improvements are to be realized. The Army and the Army National Guard have several successful models to examine. Recommend a greater use of active component soldiers assigned to functional National Guard positions be adopted.
- 6. Increase full-time National Guard general officer representation on the Joint Staff and Unified Command staffs. Elevate the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to General, and Air and Army National Guard directors to three-star positions. Assign active component officers to the National Guard units and staff. Identify National Guard assignments as career enhancing, e.g., Joint Duty, and promote using a controlled cycle modeled after the acquisition career field.
- 7. Active National Guard resource allocation process requires re-engineering. Using a first to fight first to equip policy has had unintended impact on the National Guard and resulted in serious

integration problems. The tiered readiness programs used by the Army as a funding prioritization system has had an unexpected deleterious impact on National Guard operations and maintenance, and pay and allowance funding. Basic operating costs to include pay and allowances for Congressional authorized force structure must be funded on an equal percentage basis within the Total Army.

This research project analyzed the relationship between the citizen-soldier and airman, and the active Air Force and Army. History suggests, despite recent encouraging actions by the Army and the Army Guard to mend the schism, and make integration work, that the Congress will determine the difficult choices of budget and force structure. The Guard will vehemently oppose any change that would diminish their status. The Army will likely retain its rhetorical obsequiousness toward the Guard, and its political naivete. If this look at the future is true, a process to provide for the common defense must be found without the public rancor that dominated the first decade of the post Cold War era. Recommend the Congress authorize in law the Total Force Realignment and Force Structure Commission. The commissions mandate would be to establish the active-reserve component force mixture, roles and Similar to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, all factions of the defense community would be represented. The force structure recommendation could be

accepted as presented, or rejected. No amendments will be authorized. A tough recommendation for the military services, but the consequences of inaction is too serious to be ignored.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, "Integration of the Reserve and Active Components," memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Washington, DC, 4 September 1977.
- Pat Towell, "Budget Crunch Has a Service At War With Itself, "Congressional Quarterly, 3 January 1998, 5.
- National Defense Panel, <u>Transforming Defense in the 21st Century</u>, (Arlington, VA: December 1997), 22.
- ⁴ Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, "Integration of the Reserve and Active Components," memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Washington, D.C., 4 September 1997.
- ⁵Dr. Theodore C. Mars, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, in the FY73 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Construction Authorization for the Safeguard ABM and Active Duty and
- ⁶ Samuel J. Newland, "Following Our Traditions: The National Guard and the American Way of War," (Carlisle, PA: n.d., unpublished manuscript), 6.
- There are many books that are histories and assessments of the Guard and their evolution and problems. Among the better, more current ones and those dated, but classics, are the following: Stephen M. Duncan, The Citizen Warrior, Presidio, CA, Presidio Press, 1998; Gary Hart, The Minuteman, New York: Free Press, 1998; Mark P. Meyer, The National Guard Citizen Soldier: The Linkage between Responsible National Security Policy and the Will of the People, Maxwell; AFB, AL: Maxwell Papers, 1996.
 - ⁸ Constitution, ART. I and II.
- ⁹ George Washington, "Sentiments On the Peace Establishment," (New York: Random House, 1948) cited in Samuel J. Newland, "Following Our Traditions: The National Guard and the American Way of War," (Carlisle, PA: n.d., unpublished manuscript).
- The Militia Act of 1792 specified that all able bodied males, 18-45 must serve, must be armed, and equipped at their own expense, and participate in annual musters. It created a two-category militia the all volunteer, better
- 11 The militia/reserve reforms of 1903-1920 are summarized in Hill, A History of the National Guard, 175-190, 202-221, 289-316.
- ¹² Martha Derthick, "Militia Lobby in the Missile Age: the Politics of the National Guard", in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns of Military Politics, (New York Crowell-Collier), 1962, passim. The National

Guard Association of the US with roughly 50,000 commissioned and warrant officers is considered one of the most powerful and effective interest groups in the American political system.

13 Charles J. Gross, <u>The ANG: A Short History</u> (NGB 94-1980: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 7.

14 Ibid.

Guard 1943-1969, (Office of Air Force History: USAF Washington, DC), 7.

¹⁶ Ibid. 52

- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve force Integration in Wartime," <u>Parameters</u>, Vol. 21, (1991): 35-50.
- 20 Robert L. Goldich, "The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War," (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1991), 23.
- This unusual concept had its origins in 1973-1974 at the end of Vietnam when the Army wanted to increase division strength from 13 to 16 divisions. The solution was to organize new divisions at less than full strength (minus a third brigade) and to rely on the reserve components to round out the divisions upon mobilization. As of late 1990, the number of active divisions with Roundout brigades had grown to seven out of eighteen. Also See Robert L. Goldich, "The Army's Roundout Concept after the Persian Gulf War." (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1991), 23.
- ²² Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, "Total Force Policy," Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 1973.
- ²³ Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, <u>Total Force</u> <u>Integration</u>, memorandum for Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and Service Secretaries of the Military Departments, Washington, D.C., 21 June 1982.
- ²⁴ Caspar Weinberger, Volunteer Force a Success, <u>Army</u> <u>Times</u>, Volume, 15 July 1983, 1.
- Dennis Ippolito, <u>Blunting the Sword</u>, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1994), 34.
- ²⁶ Caspar Weinberger, Address, National Press Club, Washington, D.C., November 28, 1984. These tests were: (1) Do the circumstances involve vital American interests? (2) Is there a clear intention of winning (measured in part by a willingness to use whatever military force is necessary to succeed)? (3) Are

the political and military objectives clearly defined? (4) Is there a continuing reassessment and reevaluation of the need for military force after it has been applied (i.e., in case the military objectives change)? (5) Do the American people and Congress support the effort? and, (6) Is military force being used only as a last resort?

²⁷ Harlon C. Herner, "A Battalion Commander Looks at Affiliation" Military Review, (Vol. 58, October 1978), 42.

- Government Accounting Office, Reserve Force: DOD Guidance Needed on Assigning Roles To Reserve Forces Under the Total Force Policy, (Washington, D.C.: GAO/NSIAD 90-26,7 December 1989), 1-5, 27.
- ²⁹ The geopolitical setting during the 1979 1989 period altered the existing Cold War paradigms. Defense strategy, budget and force structure for the post Cold War era would be elusive end for the Bush and Clinton administration.

30 Ippolito, 34.

- ³¹ George W. Bush, Speech to the Aspen Institute, August 2, 1990, cited by Richard Cheyney, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), 131.
- 32 Colin J. Powell, DOD News Briefing, Cable News Network, (Department of Defense, Washington, DC), 1992.

³³ Goldich, "The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War", (Washington, DC: CRS, 1991), 23.

- Robert A. Brown, et al., Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1995)
- The Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition, (Washington, D.C.: USAF, 1994), 145.
- ³⁶ Les Aspin, The Report of the Bottom Up Review, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), 23.
- Avoiding the Train Wreck, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 3-6.
- Department of Defense, <u>Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Services</u>, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), ES-1.
- Hart, 38. The Army would lose 15,000 active duty soldiers; the Army Guard would be cut by 38,000 and 7000 positions would be eliminated from the Army reserve. 27000 personnel would be cut from the Air Force. The Air Guard would lose 700 people. Modest cuts were made to DOD's three

largest acquisition programs. Finally, the QDR called for two additional rounds of base closure.

William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, (Washington, DC: DOD, 1997), 30-33.

Daniel L. Whiteside, "Why the Army National Guard? Why Not Now?" National Guard, November 1997, 16.

Total Army," National Guard, September 1997, 30-31.

43 Bradley Graham, "National Guard, Regular Army In a Tug of War," Washington Post, October 26, 1997.

44 National Defense Panel, iv.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 52.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 55.

47 See Congressional Budget Office, "Structuring U.S. Forces after the Cold War: Costs and Effects of Increased Reliance on the Reserves," (Washington, DC: CBO, 1992); also see M.K. Brauner and G.A. Gortz, "Manning Full Time Positions I Support of Selected Reserves," (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1991); Congressional Budget Office, "Structuring the Active and reserve Army of the 21st Century," (Washington, DC: CBO, December 1997), 28-34. Also see D. Allen Youngman, "Citizen-soldiers, Combat and the Future: America's Army at War with Itself" (Washington, DC: American Defense Coalition, 1997), 2-24; Barry M. Blechman and Paul N. Nagy "US. Military Strategy in the 21st Century," (Arlington, VA: IRIS: 19997).

48 Gold, Philip, "The Army Versus the National Guard". Washington Times, 5 June 1997, sec. C, p.3.

49 Duncan, 226-243.

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